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SINKING AND SWIMMING TOGETHER:
THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE,
EXTRATERRITORIAL REGULATION, AND
PRICES IN THE GENERIC DRUG MARKET
I.

INTRODUCTION

On a daily basis, people struggle to afford their medications. In recent years, the increase in generic drug prices has created a burden on
consumers.' One in four people claim they have trouble affording
their prescription drugs.2 From January 2012 to December 2017, the
top selling brand-name drugs' median cost increase was 76%.3 People
with Type 1 and Type 2 diabetes are affected by this price increase in
insulin. 4 Because people with diabetes do not produce their own insulin, they require the man-made drug version of insulin to regulate
their body's blood glucose levels and, essentially, to live.5 In 2016,
Type 1 diabetics spent $5,705 per person on insulin, compared to the
only $2,864 that was spent in 2012.6 In 2017, the price of Insulin
glargine (Lantus-a basal insulin) cost almost three-times the price in
the United States as it did in Canada, France, and Germany.? Diabetics are just one of many groups with pre-existing conditions and diseases that are affected by the increase in drug prices.8
According to Justice Cardozo, "[t]he Constitution was created in
order to ensure that the 'peoples of the several states [would] sink or
swim together.'"9 But should they have to when the odds are stacked
against them? High prices in generic drugs are devastating to patients
1. Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., The High Cost of Prescription Drugs in the United States, 316
JAMA NETWORK 858, 859 (2016).
2. Rabah Kamal et al., What are the recent and forecasted trends in prescription drug spending?, PETERSON-KFF (Feb. 20, 2019), https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/chart-collection/recent-forecasted-trends-prescription-drug-spending/#item-annual-growth-in-rx-drug-spendingand-total-health-spending-per-capita_nhe-projections-2018-27.
3. Nathan E. wineinger et al., Trends in Prices of Popular Brand-Name PrescriptionDrugs in
the United States, 2 JAMA NETWORK 1, 1 (2019).
4. Ken Alltucker, Struggling to stay alive: Rising insulin prices cause diabetics to go to extremes, USA TODAY, https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/50-states/2019/03/21/diabetes-insulin-costs-diabetics-drug-prices-increase/3196757002/ (last updated Mar. 27, 2019, 1:31 PM).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Kesselheim, supra note 1, at 859.
8. Gerald F. Anderson, It's Time to Limit Drug Price Increases, HEALTH AFFAIRS J. (Jan. 25,
2019), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20190715.557473/full/.
9. Peter C. Felmly, Beyond the Reach of States: The Dormant Commerce Clause, Extraterrito-

rial State Regulation, and the Concerns of Federalism, 55 ME. L. REV. 467, 476 (2003).
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who need medications to live healthy, normal lives.' 0 State legislatures
have been attempting to remedy this problem for their citizens."
However, the states are prohibited by the Dormant Commerce Clause
from creating legislation that impedes interstate commerce.
This Comment discusses the implications of the Dormant Commerce Clause's effect on the generic drug market. Specifically, it discusses whether the Dormant Commerce Clause applies to the generic
drug market, which lacks the competitive aspect the Dormant Commerce Clause aims to protect. Part II of this article discusses the background of the generic drug market and attempts to regulate it. Part III
of this article analyzes the impact of the Dormant Commerce Clause
on state drug-pricing legislation. Part IV of this article discusses the
impacts of applying the Dormant Commerce Clause to generic drug
pricing legislation.

II.
A.
1.

BACKGROUND

Why is There an Increase in Drug Prices?

Exclusivity in the Market

In the early 1990s, Congress enacted the Drug Price Competition
and Patent Term Restoration Act (also known as the Hatch-Waxman
Act). It was intended to provide market exclusivity to drug manufacturers.12 Congress incentivized drug manufacturers to continue producing new drugs by offering (1) 20-year patent protection, (2)
extensions on patents, (3) the right to delay U.S. Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") approval of generic drugs, and (4) other rights
providing market exclusivity.' 3 Generic drugs are therefore delayed
from entering the market, allowing for manufacturers to set the initial
price of the drug.' 4 Congress enacted a second law, the Orphan Drug
Act, which provided further market exclusivity incentives for develop10. S. Ri:p. NO. 114-429, at 7-8 (2016) [hereinafter Senate Report].
11. Steven Findlay, States Pass Record Number Of Laws To Reel In Drug Prices, KAISER
HE;AI:rH Ntws (Sept. 9, 2019), https://khn.org/news/states-pass-record-number-of-laws-to-reelin-drug-prices/.
12. Henry Waxman et al., Getting to the Root of High Prescription Drug Prices: Drivers and
potential solutions, Tin: COMMONwFAI:rI FUND (July 10, 2017), https://www.commonwealth
fund.org/sites/default/files/documents/_media-filespublications-fund-report_2017j ul_wax
man-high-drug-prices-drivers-solutions-report.pdf; Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984 (Hatch-Waxman Act), Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984).
13. Id. at 3-5.
14. Id. at 3.
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ing drugs to combat rare diseases and conditions. 15 Both of these laws
give manufacturers of generic drugs market exclusivity. 16
The primary reason for high drug prices is the protection of those
prices offered by market exclusivity through the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office ("USPTO") and the FDA. 17 In regards to patentrelated exclusivity, when a new drug product is developed, manufacturers receive a patent that lasts up to twenty years or more. 18 On the
other hand, a clinical trial and FDA's review process of a new drug
can take up to six to eight years, providing for regulatory exclusivity. 19
Further, companies can apply to have this period extended for five
more years. 20 Initial regulatory exclusivity and patent-related exclusivity generate government-granted monopolies, which in turn yield market exclusivity and the ability for a producer to set its own price. 21 In
other words, companies are able to set such high prices due to the lack
of competing manufacturers licensed to market the drug in the United
States. 22 Competition for new drugs only emerges after the monopoly
period ends.23 Once the patent runs out, generic drugs enter the market. 2 4 The caveat is that when a manufacturer develops a small change
to its currently patented drug, the USPTO allows for a new patentextending the market exclusivity period further. 25
2.

Role of Third Parties

Ultimately, drug manufacturers have nothing stopping them from
setting high prices on generic drugs. 26 The inelastic market of generic
drugs that people with pre-existing conditions need and continuously
increased prices allows manufacturers to set their own prices. 27 The
high demand for a product allows manufacturers to raise and lower
prices at their discretion. 28 Further, the market for drugs differs from
regular competitive markets because consumers do not choose the
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Kesselheim, supra note 1, at 860.
18. Id. at 861.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Kesselheim, supra note 1, at 860.
23. Id. at 861.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Robert Love, Why Our Drugs Cost So Much, AARP (May 1, 2017), https://www.aarp.org/
health/drugs-supplements/info-2017/rx-prescription-drug-pricing.html.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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product, their healthcare provider does. 29 The separate roles between
the patient, prescriber, and payer also undermines competition. 3 0 In a
regular competitive market, consumers will investigate products to decide which product gives them the most bang for their buck. 31 This
inquiry into cost-benefit analysis is what drives prices down and creates competition between manufacturers. 32 However, the generic drug
price market is different. The prescriber selects the drug, the payer
(insurer) approves the drug and pays for it, or the patient pays out of
pocket, and pharmacist sells the medications. 33 The prescriber's role
in selecting the drug prevents competition that drives down prices. 34
Another factor contributing to high drug prices is the role of public
and private payers. 35 These payers include private healthcare providers, such as doctors, private insurance companies, etc., and public
healthcare providers, such as government institutions like Medicare
and Medicaid. 36 Medicare covers senior citizens' outpatient and inpatient drug costs, and Medicaid covers low-income individuals' prescription drug costs. 37 The U.S. marketplace for drug prices and federal law prevents public payers from negotiating lower drug prices. 3 8
Private payers benefit from higher drug prices because their annual
fees can sometimes be contingent on a payer's spending on drugs. 39
Additionally, the United States healthcare system gives manufacturers the power to set their own price for a given product. 40 Other
countries, such as the United Kingdom, designate a national organization to consider whether the suggested price of a drug passes a costutility threshold. 4 1 These designated agencies provide for government
involvement in price setting, which the United States' free market theory precludes. 42

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Kesselheim,
Id.
Love, supra
Id.
Kesselheim,
Love, supra
Kesselheim,
Id.
Id.

supra note 1, at 861.
note 26.
supra note 1, at 861; see also Love, supra note 26.
note 26.
supra note 1, at 862.

Id.
Id.
Love, supra note 26.
Kesselheim, supra note 1, at 860.
Id.
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Federal Attempts to Regulate

The federal government analyzed the generic drug market in two
separate reports. 43 The first report, the Government Accountability
Office Report on Generic Drugs Under Medicine, hereinafter "GAO
Report," found that about twenty percent of "established drugs experienced an extraordinary price increase-a price increase of at least 100
percent." 44 The GAO Report stated that "'[i]f a generic drug serves a
small [patient] population, . . . it [is] more susceptible to price increases' because 'there may be little financial incentive for a [competing] manufacturer to enter the market' and thus less 'downward
pressure on price.'" 4 5 The second report, the Senate Report, Sudden

Price Spikes in Off-Patient Prescription Drugs: A Monopoly That
Harms Patients, Taxpayers, and the U.S. Healthcare System, examined the business model for seven generic drugs and uncovered the
monopoly pricing power manufacturers held. 46 The Senate Report exposed four characteristics of a generic drug that allow a company to
"exercise de facto monopoly pricing power." 4 7 Specifically, whether:
(1) the company was the only manufacturer of the generic drug; (2)
the generic drug was distributed through a "closed distribution system"; (3) the generic drug was the "gold standard"; and (4) the generic drug essential to treating a rare condition." 48
Lawmakers on both sides of the aisle are pushing for drug pricing
49
regulations; however, they are split on how to achieve their goal.
Democrats have previously attempted to push legislation that would
allow price negotiations. 50 The Trump Administration has pressed for
43. See generally U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILrrY OFFICE, GAO-16-706, GENERIC DRUGS
UNDER MEDICARE: PART D GENERIC DRUG PRICES DECLINED OVERALL, BUT SOME HAD Ex-

(2016) [hereinafter, GAO Report]; see also Senate Report,
supra note 10.
44. GAO Report, supra note 43, at 12.
45. Ass'n for Accessible Meds. v. Frosh, 887 F.3d 664, 676 (4th Cir. 2018) (Wynn, J., dissenting) (quoting GAO Report).
46. Id. See generally Senate Report, supra note 10.
47. Senate Report, supra note 10, at 4.
TRAORDINARY PRICE INCREASES

48. Id.
49. Berkeley Lovelace, Jr., CBO says House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's drug pricingplan saves
Medicare $345 billion over decade, CNBC (Oct. 14, 2019, 10:13 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/
(last up2019/10/14/nancy-pelosis-drug-pricing-plan-would-save-medicare-345-billion-cbo.html
dated Oct. 15, 2019, 8:01 PM).
50. Theodore T. Lee et al., The Politics of Medicare and Drug-PriceNegotiation, HEALTH
NEwS AFFAIRS (Sept. 19, 2016), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog2016919.056632/
full/; Robert Graham, Prescription-drugprice gouging must stop, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2019,
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/sep/16/prescription-drug-price-gouging-must-stop/.
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importation of less-expensive medications from abroad. 5 1 However,
some right-wing lawmakers oppose drug importation.5 2 Other critics
claim legislative regulations would hinder the market.5 3 Moreover,
some fear that price caps on drugs would require the manufacturer to
"eat the costs" of producing the drugs. 54 This split in Congress has
influenced states to resolve the problem on their own. 55
C.

How Are States Attempting to Solve This Problem?

In light of this drug pricing epidemic, many states have created various drug pricing regulations in an effort to protect consumers from
being extorted. 56 The efforts include creating drug transparency legislation, anti-price gouging legislation, and drug affordability boards. 57
1.

Drug Transparency Legislation

Drug transparency legislation requires manufacturers to provide advance notice of increases in drug prices. 58 For example, California enacted a drug transparency law in 2017.59 This law applies to brandname and generic drugs with a wholesale "cost of at least $40 when
the price of these drugs increases more than 16 percent in the prior 12
months or 32 percent in the preceding 24 months."60 Among other
requirements, the law requires manufacturers to give ninety-days advance notice of drug price increases to public and private purchasers. 6 1
Vermont enacted similar legislation in 2016 requiring the manufacturer to provide justification for the increase in drug costs. 62 In 2018,
Vermont expanded its 2016 legislation to require more extensive inquiries into increased drug prices. 63 Maine,64 Connecticut, 6 5 Oregon, 66
51. Associated Press, U.S. to set up plan allowing prescriptiondrugs from Canada, NBC (July
31, 2019, 8:36 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/us-set-plan-allowing-prescription-drugs-canada-n 1037156.
52. Emmarie Huetteman, GOP Senators Distance Themselves From Grassley And Trump's
Efforts to Cut Drug Prices, KAISER HEAuIII Niews (July 25, 2019), https://khn.org/news/gopsenators-distance-themselves-from-grassley-and-trumps-efforts-to-cut-drug-prices/.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Findlay, supra note 11.
56. See infra, Part II.C.
57. See infra, Part II.C.
58. Findlay, supra note 11.
59. CAL. HEALTII & SAFETY CODE § 1367.243 (West 2017).
60. Richard Cauchi, Recent Approaches and Innovations in State Prescription Drug Laws,
NCSL (May 29, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/healthlrx-costs.aspx.
61. Id.
62. VT. STAr. ANN. tit. 18 § 4635(c)(1) (2019).
63. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 4606 (2019).
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Louisiana, 67 and Nevada 68 have also passed similar drug transparency
legislation. Colorado passed legislation requiring drug manufacturers
to disclose certain information to drug prescribers in an effort to regulate drug pricing. 6 9 Maine's legislation seeks to "increase access to
low-cost prescription drugs" by establishing a program to import prescription drugs from Canada. 70
2.

Anti-Price Gouging Legislation

Price gouging occurs when retailers and manufacturers take advantage of an inelastic market and charge an unconscionable price for a
good. 71 Unconscionable is defined as unfair or unreasonable. 72 Price
gouging is illegal in many jurisdictions, especially when there is an unfair advantage or a sudden increase in demand for a good.73
Maryland enacted anti-price gouging legislation7 4 after its previous
attempt to regulate drug pricing was struck down in federal court as
unconstitutional. 75 Essentially, this law prohibits manufacturers of generic drugs from raising prices to "unconscionable" levels. 76 In Maryland's legislation, "unconscionable" was defined as "excessive and not
justified by the cost of producing the drug or the cost," which "results
in consumers for whom the drug has been prescribed having no meaningful choice about whether to purchase the drug at an excessive price
64. S.P. 350, 129th Me. Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., at 1-6 (Me. 2019) (expanding drug price
transparency).
65. Act of Jan. 1, 2020, Pub. Act 18-41, 2018 Conn. Pub. Acts, at 3-16 (concerning prescription
drug costs).
66. Prescription Drug Transparency Act, H.R. 4005, 79th Leg. Assemb., 2018 Reg. Sess. (Or.
2018).
67. H.B. 436, 2017 Leg. Assemb., 43d Reg. Sess., at 1-10 (La. 2017) (requiring drug manufactures to provide information regarding prescription drug prices).
68. S.B. 539, 2017 Gen. Assemb., 79th Reg. Sess., at 1-24 (Nev. 2017) (revising provisions
relating to prescription drugs).
69. H.R. 19-1131, 72d Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2019) (concerning a requirement to
share the wholesale acquisition cost of a drug when sharing information concerning the drug
with another party).
70. LEGIs. Doc. No. 1272, 129th Me. Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 2019).
71. Price Gouging, LEGAL DICTIONARY, https://legaldictionary.net/price-gouging/ (last visited
Feb. 2, 2020).
72. Unconscionable, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/unconscionable?s=T (last visited Feb. 2, 2020).
73. Price Gouging, supra note 71.
74. H.R. 631, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2017) (concerning public health - essential off-patent
or generic drugs - price gouging prohibition).
75. Ass'n for Accessible Meds. v. Frosh, 887 F.3d 664, 666 (4th Cir. 2018).
76. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 2-801 (west 2017).
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because of (1) the importance of the drug to their health, and (2) insufficient competition in the market for the drug." 7 7

3.

Drug Affordability Boards

Illinois has also followed this regulatory trend and attempted to enact legislation that sought to regulate generic drug prices by restricting
drug manufacturers and wholesalers from engaging in price extortion. 7 8 Illinois recently introduced the Prescription Drug Affordability
Act, which also creates a prescription drug affordability board.7 9 The
board will be appointed by various elected officials in the state.80 The
board's members must have expertise in healthcare, economics, or
clinical medicine.8 1 The legislation provides that the board shall identify prescription drug products and decide whether the product should
be subject to a cost review.8 2 It lays out the factors the board should
consider and the steps the board should take in its cost review. 83 The
legislation specifically emphasized it does not prevent a manufacturer
from marketing the drug product if it has been approved by the
FDA. 84 Maine, 85 Nevada, 86 and New Jersey 87 have all considered similar drug pricing measures.
In 2019, Maryland created a Prescription Drug Affordability
Board. 88 The Maryland board contains five members with experience
in healthcare, economics, or clinical medicine. 89 Elected officials of
the state appoint the board members.9 0 The Maryland board will perform a cost-review analysis of generic drugs that may create affordability challenges. 9 1 It considers the cost of creating the drug, the
cost to health plans, the impact on customers, and other factors. 92 The
77. Mo. Cooim ANN., HFAL:II-GEN. § 2-801(f)(1)-(2) (west 2017).
78. Illinois Generic Drug Pricing Fairness Act, H.B. 4900, 100th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill.
2018).
79. Prescription Drug Affordability Act, H.B. 3493 § 10(a)-(c), 101st Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg.
Sess. (I11. 2019).
80. Id. § 10(c).
81. Id.
82. Id. § 30.
83. Id.
84. Id. § 30(b).
85. S.B. 461, 129th Me. Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., at 1-6 (Me. 2019) (establishing the Maine Prescription Drug Affordability Board).
86. S.B. 378, 2019 Gen. Assemb., 80th Sess. (Nev. 2019).
87. N.J. Assemb. B. 4216, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2018).
88. Act of May 25, 2019, ch. 692, 2019 Md. Laws, at 1-29.
89. Id. at 6-7.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 17.
92. Id. at 18.
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board then sets a price limit for that drug and submits its proposal to
the Maryland General Assembly's Legislative Policy Commission for
approval. 93
4.

Recent Insulin Price Capping Regulation

In January 2020, Illinois became the second state to cap monthly
insulin prices. 94 Illinois' stated purpose for the Act was to make insulin affordable for the many diabetics in the state who struggle to afford the drug.95 The Act provides that "insurers that provide coverage
for prescription insulin drugs . .. shall limit the total amount that an
insured is required to pay for a thirty-day supply of covered prescription insulin drugs at an amount not to exceed $100, regardless of the
quantity or type of covered prescription insulin drug used to fill the
insured's prescription." 96 Colorado passed a similar act in 2019.97 The
Colorado act also provides for a thirty-day supply of insulin capped at
$100 per month. 98
D.

The Dormant Commerce Clause

The Constitution gives Congress the power to regulate interstate
commerce. 99 Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, states shall not
discriminate against interstate commerce, nor can they unduly burden
interstate commerce. 100 The doctrine is driven by concern about economic protectionism and seeks to deter state regulation designed to
benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors.1 0 1 Courts analyze the Dormant Commerce Clause question
under an ad hoc five factor approach.10 2 First, courts ask whether the
93. Id. at 29-30.
94. Aila Slisco, Illinois Becomes Second State to Cap Monthly Insulin Prices, and More States
Are Considering It, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 24, 2020, 10:00 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/illinoisbecomes-second-state-cap-monthly-insulin-prices-more-states-are-considering-it-1483987.
95. Jackson Danbeck, Illinois governor signs law capping insulin costs at $100 per month,
NBC15 (Jan. 24, 2020, 7:45 PM), https://www.nbcl5.com/content/news/Illinois-governor-signslaw-capping-insulin-costs-at-100-per-month-567282431.html; Pub. Act 101-0625, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (I1. 2019).
96. 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/356z.41(c) (2020).
97. H.R. 19-1216, 2019 Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., at 1-5 (Colo. 2019) (concerning measures to reduce a patient's cost of prescription insulin drugs and, in connection therewith, making an
appropriation).
98. Id.
99. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
100. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935).
101. Id.
102. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986).

98

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:89

law is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose.1 0 3 Second, the
court asks if the law will have extraterritorial regulatory effects, in
other words, when applied, will the law have the effect of regulating
out-of-state transactions. 104 Third, the court will look at whether the
state law discriminates against interstate commerce; if so, does the law
represent the least discriminatory means for the state to achieve its
purpose?1 0 5 Fourth, whether the law places burdens on interstate commerce that are obviously excessive in relation to the benefits that the
law affords to the state 106 Finally, does the law represent the least burdensome means for the state to achieve its goal? 107
Analyzing extraterritorial regulatory effects is at issue in this Comment. The dormant Commerce Clause presents an obstacle for state
regulation of generic drug prices because courts have previously held
that this type of regulation violates the extraterritoriality principle of
the Dormant Commerce Clause. 108
1.

ExtraterritorialityPrinciple History

"

The extraterritoriality principle of the Dormant Commerce Clause
prohibits states from enacting legislation which "has the practical effect of establishing a scale of prices for use in other states."1 09 While
the extraterritoriality "principle ensures that a state will not overstep
its bounds and unreasonably trample upon the authority of another
[state],"1 1 0 it is also meant to ensure free market competition.1
In Edgar v. MITE Corporation,the Supreme Court invalidated an
Illinois antitakeover statute." 2 The plurality in Edgar reasoned that
the statute was "a direct restraint on interstate commerce and that it
has a sweeping extraterritorial effect." 1 1 3 The Court was concerned
103. Lainie Rutkow et al., Law and the Public's Health, 126 Punj.ic HEAlrh Repowrs 750,
751 (2011).
104. Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 579.
105. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 392 (1994); see also S.D. Farm
Bureau, Inc. v. Hazeltine, 340 F.3d 583, 596 (8th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1037 (2004).
106. Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 356 (1951); see also S. Pacific Co. v.
Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1945).
107. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); see also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf
Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 473 (1981).
108. See generally Ass'n for Accessible Meds. v. Frosh, 887 F.3d 664, 674 (4th Cir. 2018).
109. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 528 (1935).
110. Felmly, supra note 9, at 509.
111. Baldwin, 249 U.S. at 524. ("Commerce between the states is burdened unduly when one
state regulates by indirection the prices paid to be producers in another." This ensures states do
not interfere with competition of prices in markets that reach other states.); CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 90 (1987).
112. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642 (1982) (plurality opinion).
113. Id.
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that if Illinois imposed such a regulation, other states would do so as

well, and interstate commerce (and the market) would be stifled.1 14
Justice Powell, in his concurrence, alluded to the extraterritoriality
principle's purpose being to protect the market.1 15
The Supreme Court again addressed the purpose of the extraterritoriality principle in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America.1 1 6 In
CTS Corp., the state statute at issue conditioned "acquisition of control of a corporation on approval of a majority of the pre-existing disinterested shareholders." 117 The Court explained that the Dormant
Commerce Clause scrutinizes statutes that discriminate against interstate commerce. 118 However, just because there is a burden on interstate commerce does not mean it is discriminatory. 119 The Court
further explained that to determine whether a statute is discriminatory, the statute must impose a greater burden on out-of-state participants than it does on similarly situated in-state participants. 120 The
Court further established the connection between the extraterritoriality principle and inconsistent regulations by stating that because the
Indiana Business Corporation Law did not create inconsistent regulation between states, the extraterritoriality principle was not at issue. 121
The Dormant Commerce Clause prohibits states from enacting laws
that regulate transactions that affect certain aspects of interstate commerce. 122 One of the aspects the Court is referring to is the free market system.1 2 3 According to the Court, the free market system
depends on the fact that a corporation is organized under and governed by the law of a single jurisdiction. 124 The Court is concerned
that multiple laws governing one good will hinder the market. 125 Thus,
if there are inconsistent regulations among states in the market, the
market will be adversely affected. 12 6
114. Id. ("Furthermore, if Illinois may impose such regulations, so many other States; and
interstate commerce in securities transactions generated by tender offers would be thoroughly
stifled.").
115. Id. at 646 (Powell, J., concurring).
116. CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 90.
117. Id. at 73-74.
118. Id at 87.
119. Id. at 88.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 89-90; IND. ConE § 23-1-17 (2017).
122. CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 89-90.
123. Id. at 90.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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Price Affirmation Cases

Price affirmation statutes followed the enactment of the TwentyFirst Amendment. 127 States enforced regulations to be able to monitor
the sale of alcohol products within each state.1 28 Price affirmation statutes require manufacturers and retailers to announce the price of a
good to affirm that the price will not be lower or higher than the price
in another state.1 29
In Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority, the Court invalidated a New York price affirmation statute.1 30
The statute required distillers to post monthly wholesale prices for
sales within the state and also affirm those prices were not lower or
higher than prices in other states.1 3 1 The statute prohibited distillers
from reducing their price in either New York or in other states. 132 Further, it proscribed out-of-state prices to dip below the price posted in
New York.1 3 3 The Court concluded that because the statute regulated
commerce in other states, it was prohibited by the Dormant Commerce Clause. 134
In Healy v. The Beer Institute, the Supreme Court invalidated a
Connecticut price affirmation statute, which applied to beer sales in
three bordering states.1 3 5 The Court reaffirmed Brown-Forman by
holding that a state may not adopt legislation that has the practical
effect of establishing the price of a good in another state.1 36 Further,
the Court stated that the practical effect must be evaluated by considering the consequences of the statute itself, as well as the effect the
legislation would have on interstate commerce if other states adopted
similar legislation.1 37 Ultimately, the Court struck down the statute on
the grounds that it created inconsistent legislation among other
states.1 38
127. Anne-Kathryn Claassen, Retroactivity-Though Subsequent Case Found Price Affirmation Statutes Unconstitutional, Prior Opinion Would Be Applied: Stroh Brewery Co. v. Director
of the New Mexico Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 23 N.M. L. Riev. 341, 343 (1993)
(citing U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, §§ 1-2).
128. Id.
129. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 575-76 (1986).
130. Id. at 585.
131. Id. at 576.
132. Id. at 576, 579-80.
133. Id. at 582-83 (quoting Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 521 (1935)).
134. Id. at 582.
135. Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 343 (1989).
136. Id. at 336.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 337.
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In 2003, the Supreme Court upheld a Maine statute aimed at securing lower drug prices.1 39 The Maine law created a program that would
allow the state to negotiate rebates with drug manufacturers to decrease its prices for drugs offered to the program's participants.1 40 The
Supreme Court held the state law did not constitute impermissible extraterritorial regulation. 141 The Court reasoned that the program did
not regulate any out-of-state transaction "either by its express terms
or by its inevitable effect." 14 2 Thus, the extraterritorial analysis failed
to invalidate the statute. 143
2.

Association for Accessible Medicines v. Frosh

In 2017, the Association for Accessible Medicines brought a dormant Commerce Clause challenge against a Maryland statute prohibiting "a manufacturer or wholesale distributor from engaging in price
gouging in the sale of an essential off-patent or generic drug."1 44
"Price gouging" was defined as "an unconscionable increase in the
price of a prescription drug."1 45 The District Court initially held the
statute was only triggered when the drug was made available for sale
within Maryland.1 46 However, the Fourth Circuit reversed the trial
court's decision and concluded Maryland's statute prohibiting price
gouging in the sale of prescription drugs violated the Dormant Commerce Clause. 147
First, the Fourth Circuit determined that the statute did not trigger
any conduct that took place within Maryland.1 48 However, the Fourth
Circuit found the language of the act indicated that its application was
not limited to sales within Maryland.1 49 The Fourth Circuit struck the
statute down on the grounds that it might create inconsistencies in the
market among other states.1 50 The Court was concerned the "statute
Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of America v. Walsh, 538 U.S 644, 649, 670 (2003).
Id. at 649.
Id. at 669.
Id.
Id.
Ass'n for Accessible Meds. v. Frosh, 887 F.3d 664, 666-67 (4th Cir. 2018) (quoting MD.
CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN § 2-802(a) (West 2017)).
145. Id. at 666 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 2-801(c) (west 2017)).
146. Id. at 670.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 671 (citing MD. CODE. ANN., HEAi.TH-GEN. § 2-801(b)(1)(iv) (West 2017)).
150. Ass'n for Accessible Meds., 887 F.3d at 671, 673-74 (citing MD. CODE ANN., HEALTHGEN. § 2-801(b)(1)(iv) (West 2017)).
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
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could manifest itself in a wholesale transaction that occurs out-ofstate," creating inconsistent prices across state lines. 15 1
Second, the Court held that even if the statute triggered activity
that took place in Maryland, it might still affect the prices of transac-

tions that occur outside of the state.15 2 The court reasoned the statute
was essentially a price control act that affected prices outside of Mary-

land's borders.1 53
Finally, the statute, if similarly enacted by other states, would impose a significant burden on interstate commerce involving prescription drugs. 54 The majority stated that the act would set drug prices in
a way that would "'interfere with the natural function of the interstate
market' by superseding market forces that dictate the price of a
good."1 55 The majority was concerned the statute may burden manufacturers by requiring them to modify their distribution and tailor
their agreements with other states so as to not violate Maryland's restrictions.1 56 The Fourth Circuit explicitly stated its holding did not
limit states to enact legislation intended to lower drug prices; the Maryland statute went just beyond the state's police power.1 57
The dissent argued that the Maryland statute did not violate the
Dormant Commerce Clause because it did "not implicate the concerns that lie at the heart" of the doctrine.1 58 The dissent stated that
Maryland had the authority to regulate drug pricing under its general
police powers. 159 Further, the dissent agreed with the District Court's
initial finding that the statute is "triggered only when there is a drug
...
made available for sale within [Maryland]." 160 Maryland asserted
that its statute "does not reach, or purport to reach, any stream of
commerce that does not end in Maryland."161 Therefore, according to
the dissent, the statute did not violate the extraterritorial principle.16 2
The dissent further argued that the majority's extension of the extra151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
andria
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id.
Id. at 670-71 (citing MD. ComE. ANN., HeAl:ti-GEN. § 2-801(b)(1)(iv) (West 2017)).
Id. at 672.
Id. at 670.
Id. at 673 (citing McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S. 221, 235 (2013) (quoting Hughes v. AlexScrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 806 (1976))).
Ass'n for Accessible Meds., 887 F.3d at 673-74.
Id. at 674.
Id. at 675 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
Id. (wynn, J., dissenting).
Id. at 678 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
Id. at 679 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
Ass'n for Accessible Meds., 887 F.3d at 686 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
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territoriality principle goes beyond the Supreme Court's application
of it.163

III.

ANALYSIS

The Dormant Commerce Clause stems from a line of price affirmation statute cases and statutes that link in-state prices with out-of-state
prices. 164 There are two theories that support the Dormant Commerce
Clause: the political theory and the economic theory. 165 The political
theory is that if one state ("State A") is regulating in a way that affects
another state ("State B"), at some point the regulation in State A will
affect the people of State B.1 66 However, the people of State B are not
represented in State A, thus, the Dormant Commerce Clause remedies this by prohibiting State A from imposing its regulations on State
B. 167 On the other hand, the economic theory is that regulations of
interstate commerce will adversely affect the free market system in
the United States.1 68 While both economic and political theories support the Dormant Commerce Clause, the economic theory goes a step
further to support an the Dormant Commerce Clause's extraterritoriality principle that states "may not regulate commerce occurring
wholly outside its boundaries."'1 69
At the heart of the Dormant Commerce Clause lies apprehension
of economic protectionism and the extraterritoriality principle.1 70 The
extraterritoriality principle is the notion that states may not engage in
setting legislation which has the practical effect of establishing "a scale
of prices for use in other states." 17 1 Economic protectionism is aimed
at preventing states from insulating interstate competition,1 72 in other
words, states trying to favor in-state economic interests over out-ofstate economic interests.1 73 The extraterritoriality principle and economic protectionism are meant to ensure that the free market sys163. Id. at 687 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 686 (wynn, J., dissenting) (quoting Energy & Envtl. Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d
1169, 1172 (10th Cir. 2015)).
165. See generally S.C. State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 184 (1938).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 90 (1987).
169. Ass'n for Accessible Meds., 887 F.3d at 680-81 (Wynn, J., dissenting) (quoting Healy v.
Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989)).
170. Id. at 675 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
171. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 528 (1935).
172. Id. at 523.
173. Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism:Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1096 (1986).
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tem's price competition is not affected by out-of-state regulations. 174
But what if there is no price competition in a specific marketplace?
As discussed above, the generic drug market lacks the competitive
aspect that most markets exhibit due to the third-party involvement of
healthcare providers and the manufacturers' ability to set prices for
their own drugs. In Association for Accessible Medicines, the Fourth
Circuit misapplied the extraterritoriality principle in holding the state
statute at issue was invalid according to the Dormant Commerce
Clause. 175 Further, courts should set aside the Dormant Commerce
Clause analysis due to the unnatural function of the generic drug
market.176
A.

The Fourth Circuit's Flaws

The Fourth Circuit focused on strictly applying the extraterritoriality principle to the Maryland price-gouging prohibition statute at issue
in the case.1 77 The Fourth Circuit's sole justification for disabling the
price-gouging prohibition is based on the Supreme Court's principle
against extraterritoriality.1 78 The majority suggested that "[a] state law
violates the extraterritoriality principle if it either expressly applies to
out-of-state commerce or has that 'practical effect,' regardless of the
legislature's intent." 17 9 The Court concluded that the Maryland statute
violates the Dormant Commerce Clause because it "controls the price
of transactions that occur wholly outside of the state." 180 The Court's
approach is flawed for the following reasons.
1.

First Flaw: Misapplication of The ExtraterritorialityDoctrine

The Fourth Circuit misapplied the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine because the Dormant Commerce Clause only applies to a regulation that fixes the price of a product and links the price of out-of-state
products to its in-state product's price. 18 1 The majority held that since
the regulation "directly regulates transactions that take place outside
174. Id. at 1092, 1094-96.
175. Ass'n for Accessible Meds., 887 F.3d at 692-93 (wynn, J., dissenting).
176. See infra Part IV.B.
177. Ass'n for Accessible Meds., 887 F.3d at 674.
178. Id. at 669-70. See generally Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989) (explaining the
Supreme Court's extraterritoriality principle).
179. Ass'n for Accessible Meds., 887 F.3d at 668 (quoting Star Sci., Inc. v. Beales, 278 F.3d 339,
355 (4th Cir. 2002)).
180. Id. at 671. See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573,
580 (1986) ("The mere fact that the effects of New York's ABC Law are triggered only by sales
of liquor within the State of New York . . . does not validate the law if it regulates the out-ofstate transactions of distillers who sell in-state.").
181. Id. at 681 (wynn, J., dissenting).
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The majority's opinion relies on three Supreme Court casesHealy, Baldwin, and Brown-Forman-allof which concern economic
protectionism and the extraterritoriality principle.1 83 Under all three
cases, the majority held that "a non-discriminatory State law regulating an upstream transaction in a stream of transactions that ends in
the State. . . constitutes an unconstitutional regulation of 'wholly' out
of state 'commerce.'" 184 However, the three cases which the majority
relies on only apply to "price control or price affirmation statutes that
link in-state prices with those charges elsewhere and discriminate
against out-of-staters." 185 In other words, the extraterritoriality analysis should only be applied to price affirmation statutes and statutes
that force an out-of-state merchant to seek regulatory approval in one
state before undertaking a transaction in another. 186 The Maryland
statute at issue here was neither a price affirmation statute, nor did it
link in-state prices to out-of-state prices.1 87
Accordingly, the majority misapplied Healy, Baldwin, and BrownForman because those cases and the extraterritoriality principle only
apply to a statute that (1) prescribes the price of a product and (2) ties
the price of out-of-state prices to its in-state product's price. 188 The
Supreme Court has only struck down those two types of statutes on
extraterritoriality grounds. 189 In Association for Accessible Medicines,
the Maryland statute regulated upstream sales in streams of transactions that end in Maryland. 190 In other words, it regulated transactions
beginning in other states, but ending in Maryland. Therefore, it "does
not regulate any stream of economic activity that does not enter Maryland's borders." 191 The Maryland statute also did not dictate the
prices that manufacturers were required to charge in other states.1 92
Nor did the Maryland statute regulate commerce occurring "wholly
outside" of Maryland's borders (i.e., tie in-state products to out-of182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id. at 674.
Id. at 667-70.
Id. at 684 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
Energy & Envtl. Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1174 (10th Cir. 2015).
Ass'n for Accessible Meds., 887 F.3d at 686 (wynn, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 684-85.
Id.
Id. at 683.
Id.
Ass'n for Accessible Meds., 887 F.3d at 686 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
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state prices, or vice versa). 193 Thus, the majority failed to accurately
base its holding on extraterritorial grounds.
Further, the Fourth Circuit erroneously based its entire Dormant
Commerce Clause analysis on the extraterritoriality principle. As Professor Donald Regan has explained, "[i]t is clear that the Court cannot
flatly prohibit all state laws that have extraterritorial effects, or even
all state laws that have substantial extraterritorial effects. Such a prohibition would invalidate much too much legislation. If extraterritorial
effects are to have any constitutional relevance, the most the Court
can possibly say is that extraterritorial effects count against a piece of
state legislation." 94 The extraterritoriality analysis is only a piece of
the Dormant Commerce Clause analysis, thus, it should not be the
only basis for the majority's holding in this case. 195
2.

Second Flaw: A Decision Based on Fear

Second, the majority's holding was a result of its fear of inconsistent
regulations, which is another driving force behind the extraterritoriality doctrine. 196 The majority stated, "[i]f Maryland compels manufacturers to sell prescription drugs in the initial transaction at a particular
price, but another state imposes a different price, then manufacturers
could not comply with both laws in a single transaction." 197 However,
this statement is flawed because the Maryland statute does not "compel manufacturers to sell . . . at a particularprice," rather, it forbids
unconscionable price increases.1 98 The manufacturers are still able to

set their own prices within broad limits.
The majority does not justify invalidating the statute on the extraterritoriality principle's inconsistency grounds. In order "[t]o show the
threat of inconsistent regulation, [p]laintiffs must either present evidence that conflicting, legitimate legislation is already in place or that
the threat of legislation is both actual and imminent." 199 Here, the
majority did not cite any inconsistent legislation from another state. 200
The error in the majority's reasoning here is that this is an if/then193. Id.
194. Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America and
Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) ExtraterritorialState Legislation, 85 Mich. L. REV.
1865, 1878 (1987).
195. Id.
196. Ass'n for Accessible Meds., 887 F.3d at 673-74.
197. Id. at 673.
198. Id. at 689 (Wynn, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
199. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1104-05 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting S.D. Myers, Inc. v. City & Cty. of S.F., 253 F.3d 461, 469-70 (9th Cir. 2001)).
200. Ass'n for Accessible Meds., 887 F.3d at 689.
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hypothetical. The potential legislation is not already in place. That is
not to say this potential legislation is not imminent; however, since it
has not occurred the majority cannot base its reasoning on this theory.
Lastly, the majority fears a regulation of this nature will interfere
with the market. 20 1 This fear stems from the majority's prohibition
against inconsistent regulations. 202
3.

Third Flaw: Rejecting the Dormant Commerce Clause
Application

Even if the Fourth Circuit's application of the extraterritorial analysis were accurately applied, the circumstances surrounding the regulations themselves do not implicate the dormant Commerce Clause. As
the dissent suggested, the Maryland statute at issue in Association for
Accessible Medicines does not implicate the issues that lie at the heart
of the Dormant Commerce Clause. 2 03 The majority stated the statute
"sets prescription drug prices in a way that 'interfere[s] with the natural function of the interstate market' by superseding market forces
that dictate the price of a good." 2 04 However, the generic drug price
market is not a "naturally functioning" market. 20 5 Thus, states should
be allowed to regulate the drug price market under the states' general
police powers. 206
a.

Generic Drug Price Market Function

The generic drug market lacks the competitive aspect that most
markets exhibit. 2 07 The noncompetitive aspect of the market supports
208
This is
the claim that the generic drug market functions unnaturally.
a result of the third-party involvement of healthcare providers, such as
hospitals, doctors, insurance companies, and the manufacturers' ability to set prices for their own drugs. 209 In a typical market, such as
electronics, consumers scout out the best price for a new television,
210
which in turn drives down the price, and thus, drives competition.
As explained in Part III, physicians make decisions for their patients
201. Id. at 673-74.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 675 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 673.
205. See generally Erin C. Fuse Brown, Resurrecting Health Care Rate Regulation, 67 HAS.
TINGs L.J. 85, 94-103 (2015) (describing the loss of competition and failures in the healthcare
system).
206. Ass'n for Accessible Meds., 887 F.3d at 675.
207. Fuse Brown, supra note 205, at 94.
208. Id.
209. See generally id. at 94-103.
210. Love, supra note 26.
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about which medications their patients should take. 21 ' Thus, the infor-

mation given to consumers-patients is trivial compared to consumers
in markets such as the electronics market. 2 12 Physicians prescribe patients medications the physician is most familiar with-this information
typically comes from the drug manufacturers. 213 Unlike the electronics market, consumers in the drug market lack the opportunity to
make informed decisions about their medications. 2 14 Thus, the drug
market does not function the same way other markets function. 2 1 5 On
the other end of the market, manufacturers have the luxury of setting
prices to almost whatever they want. 216 This price setting power comes
from patenting, insurance providers, and physicians. 2 17 Consequently,
the issue with the generic drug market is that there is not a functioning
competitive marketplace. 2 18
4.

The Fourth Circuit's Final Flaw

The final flaw in the majority's reasoning is that because the Maryland statute sets prescription drug prices, the natural function of the
market will be obstructed and the overall market will be affected. 2 19
However, the generic drug price market is not a "naturally functioning" market. 220 The interference of third parties in the generic drug
market and the monopoly power vested in drug manufacturing companies challenge any aspect of the market's "natural function." 221 The
majority's fear of third party interference stems from its fear of inconsistent prices placing undue burdens not only on interstate commerce,
but on the market as a whole. 222 The Fourth Circuit allows this fear to
override the state's police power to regulate on behalf of its citizens
by striking down the Maryland statute. 223
Whether or not states have the power to regulate on behalf of their
citizens has been a struggle for courts to decide. 224 The Supreme
211. Fuse Brown, supra note 205, at 98; Love, supra note 26.
212. Love, supra note 26.
213. Fuse Brown, supra note 205, at 98-99.
214. Id. at 98.
215. Id.
216. Love, supra note 26.
217. Id.
218. Fuse Brown, supra note 205, at 103.
219. Ass'n for Accessible Meds. v. Frosh, 887 F.3d 664, 673 (4th Cir. 2018).
220. See generally Fuse Brown, supra note 205, at 94-103 (describing the loss of competition
and failures in the healthcare system).
221. Ass'n for Accessible Meds., 887 F.3d at 691.
222. Id. at 673.
223. Id. at 675 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
224. Felmly, supra note 9, at 468.
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Court has recognized that states may supersede market forces by imposing wage and price restrictions when gross inequality in bargaining
power leads to market failure. 225 On the other hand, the Court has
stated, "[w]hile a State may seek lower prices for its consumers, it may
not insist that producers or consumers in other States surrender
whatever competitive advantages they may possess." 226
Specifically, the Court has grappled with this question: when a competitive market is virtually nonexistent, should the Dormant Commerce Clause apply in full force? 227 The answer is no. The Supreme
Court previously explained that where there is actual competition in
the marketplace, the Dormant Commerce Clause's objective is to protect that competition. 228 Justice Scalia wrote, "[i]n the absence of actual or prospective competition between supposedly favored and
disfavored entities in a single market there can be no local preference,
whether by express discrimination against interstate commerce or undue burden upon it, to which the dormant Commerce Clause may apply." 229 In other words, when there is an absence of actual
competition, the possibility for state discrimination or burden on competition is nonexistent.
By adopting the theory that the Dormant Commerce Clause should
not apply to a noncompetitive market, courts will likely conclude that
the Dormant Commerce Clause does not apply to the generic drug
market. 230 The majority's reasoning for striking down the Maryland
statute is not justified on Dormant Commerce Clause grounds, specifically extraterritorial grounds. In the generic drug price market, states
are not trying to favor their drug manufacturers over others; the states
are attempting to remedy an obstacle for their citizens. 2 31 Due to the
scarcity in competition, the extraterritorial prohibition and economic
protectionism concerns that drive the Dormant Commerce Clause are
not implicated in the generic drug market, nor state statutes regulating
225. w. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937) (upholding state minimum wage
law because a class of workers were in an unequal position to bargain and thus were
defenseless).
226. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 580 (1986).
227. Felmly, supra note 9, at 468.
228. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 300 (1997).
229. Id.
230. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 90 (1987) (because the generic
drug market lacks the competitive aspect which the dormant Commerce Clause seeks to
protect).
231. Anna Zaret & Darien Shanske, The Dormant Commerce Clause: What Impact Does It
Have on the Regulation of PharmaceuticalCosts?, NAT'L ACAD. ST. HEALTH PoL'y (Nov. 2017),
https://nashp.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/DCC-white-Paper.pdf.
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the market. 232 Thus, contrary to the Fourth Circuit's approach, the unnatural function of the generic drug price market precludes the Dormant Commerce Clause's extraterritorial analysis. 2 33
IV.

IMPACT

The Fourth Circuit's approach broadens the extraterritoriality principle. The court's holding in Association for Accessible Medicines essentially strikes down any legislation that directly limits or prohibits
unreasonably high generic drug prices. It applies Dormant Commerce
Clause analysis to a market that does not possess the same competitive functions other markets do.
What does this mean for consumers in the generic drug market?
Due to this decision, consumers-patients will be forced to sink, rather
than swim. If other courts follow the Fourth Circuit's approach, many
state consumer protection statutes would be rendered unconstitutional.2 34 People will continue to struggle with affording life-preserving medications. Further, the Fourth Circuit's approach prevents
states from protecting their consumers and its decision enhances "federal courts' authority to second guess states' efforts to protect their
citizens." 235 For example, anti-price-gouging statutes, like the one in
Association for Accessible Medicines, would be prohibited on Dormant Commerce Clause grounds due to the potential extraterritorial
effect the regulation might have. 236 However, there are three other
types of legislation that would pass the Fourth Circuit's approach.
Drug transparency legislation, drug affordability boards, and recent
insulin price capping legislation can pass Dormant Commerce Clause
analysis.
A.

Drug Transparency Legislation

Drug transparency legislation would be upheld if it were scrutinized
under the Fourth Circuit's approach because the legislation does not
control drug prices, it merely requires transparency and notification of
higher prices. If the legislation is fashioned with regard for administrative costs, (i.e., manufacturers' profits, costs of producing the drug,
etc.), then the Dormant Commerce Clause will not prohibit it.237 The
Dormant Commerce Clause is concerned with regulations that ad232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Ass'n for Accessible Meds. v. Frosh, 887 F.3d 664, 675 (4th Cir. 2018).
Gen. Motors Corp., 519 U.S. at 300.
Ass'n for Accessible Meds., 887 F.3d at 692-93.
Id.
Id. at 673-74.
Zaret & Shanske, supra note 231.
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versely affect or discriminate against interstate commerce. Drug transparency legislation simply requires manufacturers to be honest and up
front with the public about the prices they are setting. The drug transparency legislation does not invoke the Dormant Commerce Clause

because it does not proscribe certain prices.
B.

Drug Affordability Boards

Another type of legislation that would likely pass the Fourth Circuit's analysis are the implementation of drug affordability boards.
Similar to drug transparency legislation, these boards do not prevent
the marketing of products, they merely require cost review for pricing
of products. 238 Since drug transparency legislation and drug affordability boards do not involve setting prices, they would not be
subject to extraterritoriality scrutiny. 239 The extraterritoriality principle scrutinizes legislation that ultimately affects interstate commerce.
Here, drug affordability boards are merely analyzing and approving
prices of products. Thus, Dormant Commerce Clause analysis is not
invoked.
C.

Insulin Price Capping Legislation

Insulin price capping legislation will also pass the Dormant Commerce Clause analysis. For example, the Illinois statute capping insulin
prices imposes a price limit on the insurer, rather than the manufacturer. 240 Consequently, other states are excluded from the transaction.
Thus, the Fourth Circuit's concern that the regulation will impact
transactions that occur wholly outside the state is not a concern
here. 241 Further, because the effect of the capped price falls on transactions that happen within the state enacting the legislation, the Dormant Commerce Clause will not invalidate the statute.
D.

Positive Impact from Legislation

The positive impacts of these three types of legislation will hold
drug manufacturer's accountable, aiding in creating affordable medications. Thus, drug pricing legislation will allow people to afford the
drugs they need to live, rather than be forced to pay unconscionable
prices for medications.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Love, supra note 26.
Ass'n for Accessible Meds., 887 F.3d at 673; see also Zaret & Shanske, supra note 231.
Pub. Act 101-0625, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (III. 2019).
Ass'n for Accessible Meds., 887 F.3d at 671.
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One cannot fault the Fourth Circuit's majority for its conclusion because it was based on a traditional approach in an unresolved issue.
On the other hand, when considering the noncompetitive characteristic of the generic drug market, applying the Dormant Commerce
Clause would be erroneous. The Dormant Commerce Clause analysis
does not function properly in the generic drug market because the
market lacks the competitive aspect that the Dormant Commerce
Clause is meant to protect. If the courts follow the approach of abandoning the Dormant Commerce Clause analysis when there is no
competition to protect, then most legislation regarding drug prices will
pass.

V.

CONCLUSION

Not being able to afford insulin, EpiPens, or other life-enhancing
medications is a genuine fear for many Americans. Twenty-five percent of people claim obtaining their prescription drugs is difficult. 242
The feeling when you are down to your last vial of insulin, or have run
out completely, is alarming. Many Americans ration their medicines
and supplies, some going as far as to travel overseas for their medications, because an international flight is cheaper than the alternative. 243
People should not be forced to pay extremely high prices for their
medication. Not only is the Fourth Circuit's application of the Dormant Commerce Clause flawed, the Dormant Commerce Clause
should not have applied in the first place. The purpose of the Dormant Commerce Clause and its extraterritorial principle is to ensure
the market is not superseded by extraterritorial forces and competition is not adversely impacted. Nevertheless, the noncompetitive feature of the generic drug market does not require Dormant Commerce
Clause analysis. In a recent Court of Appeals case in Maryland, the
court briefly addressed the topic of competition in a marketplace. 244
The court mentions that the Dormant Commerce Clause focuses on
markets with actual or prospective competition in them. 245 Furthermore, the 2020 election will likely be impactful on the generic drug
market and the healthcare system as a whole. If true and actual competition is brought back into the marketplace, it is possible the Dor242. Kamal et al., supra note 2.
243. Rachel Roberts, Big Ticket Drug: The Cost of Staying Alive, Hit.i MAG. (Sept. 6, 2019),
https://hillmag.uark.edulbig-ticket-drug-the-cost-of-staying-alive/.
244. Wynne v. Comptroller, 228 A.3d 1129, 1142 (Md. 2020).
245. Id.
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mant Commerce Clause will be applicable, but until then, it should

not be.
Rebecca Roberts
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